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COUNTRY USSR and Satellites

SUBJECT SOVIET AND SATELLITE RADIO APPRAISALS OF
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INTRODUCTION: Among the available Soviet and Soviet-influenced radio appraisals of the CFM Conference results, perhaps the most attention-getting have been the expressions of opinion to the general effect that "the results... represent definite progress in the cause of strengthening international cooperation." It should be noted, however, that most of such favorable evaluations are dovetailed into a previously established pattern of propaganda* for crediting the USSR with responsibility for the "agreed-upon decisions," for derogating the Western contributions to these decisions, and for blaming the Western Powers with having prevented solution of the "fundamental" German problems.

"PROGRESS IN... STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION": Radio Moscow's 21 June broadcast of a PRAVDA article by Yuri Zhukov** points to the following as evidence of "definite progress": (1) the agreement on the Austrian treaty; (2) the decision to continue quadripartite consultations in Berlin; and (3) the provision for "the calling of the next CFM session on the German question." It is implied, moreover, that the fact of agreement is of even greater importance than the substance of the agreements--since the "true significance of the agreement reached consists first of all in the fact that it marks a very serious step toward the restoration of the regular activity of the CFM. Contributing to the clearing of the inter-

* Outlined in Report No. 7 (17 June) of this series.

** PRAVDA's Paris correspondent during the Conference. Given wide distribution by the Soviet radio, his articles (including this one) have established the line for other commentaries from Radio Moscow--as well as for comments by the Satellite and Soviet-controlled German radios.

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national atmosphere, this agreement opens the way to the settlement of the basic problems for which the CFM was created." Zhukov also feels that the Conference was of value in "defining the positions" of the conference.*** Satellite and Soviet-controlled German radios generally echo Zhukov's favorable appraisal and give all credit for the "progress" to the Soviet Union. Occasional Soviet-controlled German statements, however, show considerable disappointment; it is said in one broadcast, for example, that the agreements reached "are more than nothing, but also less than what the German people had good reason to expect...." Germans are urged to take the initiative for the restoration of Germany's unity.

"THE REAL MEANING OF THE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED": In probing the "true significance" of the agreements reached, Zhukov (and others echoing him) is not content to stop with general statements of unrelieved optimism about either the agreements or the future CFM activities. For immediately after such statements, he proceeds to declare:

"The real meaning of the agreement achieved consists largely of the fact that it clearly demonstrates the possibility of reaching agreed decisions while the method of 'Diktat' is left outside the threshold of the CFM. It would be extremely good for the cause of peace if this lesson would be completely digested by those reactionary circles of the U.S. who up till now have not yet parted with their impracticable hope to dominate the world."

In fact, a major portion of Zhukov's article, as broadcast by Moscow, is designed to show that although the Western Powers obstructed "basic" agreement, they "were deprived of the possibility of breaking up the talks. They preferred to look for an agreement on current questions relating to Germany and on the question of the Austrian agreement"; and, "as always upholding the policy of strengthening international cooperation, the USSR delegation fully proved her good will to reach an agreed decision" concerning these questions.

WHY THE WESTERN POWERS "CHANGED THEIR TACTICS": Following his implication that the Western Powers initially wanted to "break up the talks" (or, as Linetsky puts it, "to nail the CFM in a coffin")—a possibility of which they were "deprived"—Zhukov proceeds to explain the Western "change of tactics" that presumably occurred. Ascribing the explanation to "journalistic circles," he cites "two causes" for the change: (1) Western recognition of the growing world peace movement; and (2) Western recognition of the "recession menacing the Western world." Relative to the first, which has been a relatively undeveloped line in previous Soviet propaganda about the Conference, Zhukov contends that "to have broken up the negotiations" in the face of the Soviet-led world "movement for peace against the instigators of war" would have "meant that the... Western Powers would appear... as the avowed accomplices of the instigators of war." Regarding the second imputed cause, which has often been cited as the reason for Western interest in a limited economic agreement, Zhukov implies that there was more than a mere coincidence between the recent American stock market drop and the beginning of the closed CFM meetings "in search of a partial agreement" on Germany and of an Austrian treaty solution. He also points to the falling American production index and to mounting American unemployment as "circumstances" forcing "the most farseeing representatives of U.S. business circles to raise... the question of the necessity to restore normal trade relations with the East.... Such are the factors which moved the Western delegations to the concluding of a partial agreement relating to the German question." Satellite and Soviet-controlled German radios repeat the thesis that increasing "signs of an economic crisis" coerced the Western Powers into a limited economic agreement.

"THE DECISIVE ROLE IN ACHIEVING AGREEMENT WAS PLAYED BY THE SOVIET UNION": Thus, in so many words, Zhukov claims Soviet credit for the agreements reached. Apparently neither he nor Linetsky sees any contradiction between such claims and the above-cited "causes" of the Western "change," for Linetsky reiterates the same claims when he says:

"Throughout the work of the Paris session the delegation of the Soviet Union consistently displayed its readiness to come to concerted decisions. It showed constant initiative and made concrete proposals on every question.... And it was this line of the Soviet delegation which led in the final analysis to the agreements...."

Linetsky accuses the "reactionary press of doing all in its power to belittle or distort

*** It is of some interest that this identical line was used by the Soviet radio immediately after the CFM Conference in Moscow approximately two years ago.

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the decisive constructive part which the Soviet delegation played in the agreements reached." He also attacks the "policy of (continued) blackmail" advocated by those who wanted the Conference to fail--a policy that Linetsky identifies with "the Western Union and the North Atlantic Treaty; that is, the method of putting together aggressive war blocs."

"FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS" AND "GENUINE ATTITUDES": Zhukov repeats the now-familiar Soviet comparisons between the righteously just Soviet proposals on the "fundamental problems" of Germany and the alleged Western intentions to maintain dismemberment and occupation "for a long and indefinite time." It is of interest that he attempts to identify the Soviet peace treaty proposals--the "touchstone" revealing the participants' "genuine attitude" towards Germany--with the previous Soviet proposals at the Conference. "The line of the Soviet Government (on a peace treaty)," he says, "had already become clear during the discussion of the first question on the agenda." And he finds it significant that "the most categorical (Western) rejections were directed against the proposal (on) the withdrawal of occupation troops...." (Although Moscow and the Satellites report Vishinsky's speech on CFM authority for concluding a Japanese peace treaty, no comment on the subject has appeared as yet.)

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